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According to the hybrid theory of object recognition (J. E. Hummel, 2001), ignored object images are
represented holistically, and attended images are represented both holistically and analytically. This
account correctly predicts patterns of visual priming as a function of translation, scale (B. J. Stankiewicz
& J. E. Hummel, 2002), and left–right reflection (B. J. Stankiewicz, J. E. Hummel, & E. E. Cooper,
1998). The model also predicts that priming for attended images will generalize over configural
distortions (split images), whereas priming for ignored images will not. Three experiments tested and
confirmed this prediction. Split images visually primed their intact and split counterparts when they were
attended but not when they were ignored, whereas intact images primed themselves whether they were
attended or not. The data contribute to the growing body of evidence that 1 function of visual attention
is to permit the generation of explicitly relational representations of object shape.
The human capacity for visual object recognition is character-
ized by a number of properties that are jointly very challenging to
explain. Among the most notable is that the visual representation
of shape is invariant with (i.e., insensitive to) the location of the
image in the visual field (Biederman & Cooper, 1991a), the size of
the image (Biederman & Cooper, 1992), left–right (i.e., mirror)
reflection (Biederman & Cooper, 1991a; Davidoff & Warrington,
2001), and some rotations in depth (Biederman & Gerhardstein,
1993, 1995; but see Tarr & Bu¨lthoff, 1995). Object recognition is
also remarkably robust to variations in shape (Davidoff & War-
rington, 1999). For example, a child’s drawing of a car may be
easily recognizable as a car, even if it resembles neither any
particular real car nor any road-worthy object. At the same time,
object recognition is sensitive to rotations about the line of sight
(Jolicœur, 1985; Tarr & Pinker, 1989, 1990) and some rotations in
depth (see Lawson, 1999, for a review).
The combination of view-invariant and view-dependent proper-
ties of object recognition is problematic for theories that rely
exclusively on the geometric properties of object shape—for ex-
ample, by matching 2-D images to 3-D models in memory (e.g.,
Lowe, 1987; Ullman, 1989, 1996) or by using mathematical inter-
polation to determine whether a given image is a “legal” projection
of a familiar shape (e.g., Poggio & Edelman, 1990; Ullman &
Basri, 1991). A visual system that relied exclusively on the laws of
projective geometry would be equally able to accommodate all
variations in viewpoint (which the human visual system does not)
but would not tolerate variations in object shape (which the human
visual system does). Such a visual system would also fail to treat
an image and its left–right reflection as equivalent.
In the attempt to better explain the properties of human object
recognition, a number of researchers have proposed that objects
are visually represented as structural descriptions specifying the
object’s features or parts in terms of their (typically categorical)
interrelations (Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992;
Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996b, 1998; Marr & Nishihara, 1978;
Palmer, 1977; Winston, 1975). For example (see Biederman,
1987), a coffee mug might be represented as a curved cylinder (the
handle) side-attached to a straight vertical cylinder (the body).
Like human shape perception, this description is unaffected by
translation across the visual field, changes in size, left–right re-
flection, and some rotations in depth. However, it is sensitive to
rotations about the line of sight (e.g., a 90° rotation changes the
side-attached relation between the cup handle and body to an
above-attached relation). The description also applies to many
different mugs, permitting generalization over metric variations in
the shapes of a class of objects.
One of the most important properties of a structural description
is that it is an analytic representation, meaning that it specifies the
relations among an object’s parts both explicitly and independently
of the parts (Hummel, 2000; Hummel & Biederman, 1992). For
example, the spatial relation between the body and the handle of a
coffee mug is explicitly described as “side-attached”; this spatial
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relation is independent of the parts it describes and may be used in
conjunction with other parts to describe a different object. In
contrast, a holistic representation, such as a 3-D model (e.g., Lowe,
1987; Ullman, 1989, 1996), a 2-D “view” (e.g., Poggio & Edel-
man, 1990; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999; Tarr & Bu¨lthoff, 1995),
or an object “fragment” (Edelman & Intrator, 2000, 2003), does
not represent the relations among an object’s parts explicitly or
independently of those parts. Instead, an object’s features or parts
are represented in terms of their literal positions in a 2-D (in the
case of view- and fragment-based models) or 3-D (in the case of
model-based models) coordinate system (see Hummel, 2000,
2003a, for reviews).
Consistent with the structural description account of shape per-
ception, there is evidence that the visual system represents the
relations among an object’s parts both explicitly (Hummel &
Stankiewicz, 1996b; Palmer, 1978; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984)
and independently of the parts themselves (Saiki & Hummel,
1998a, 1998b). However, two properties of object perception are
inconsistent with the properties of analytic representations. First,
despite the substantial evidence that feature conjunctions require
time-consuming attentional resources (Logan, 1994; Luck & Vo-
gel, 1997; Treisman & Gelade, 1980), there is evidence that object
recognition does not require visual attention. For example, numer-
ous studies have demonstrated either negative priming (e.g., Mur-
ray, 1995; Tipper, 1985; Treisman & DeSchepper, 1996) or pos-
itive priming for ignored object images (Stankiewicz & Hummel,
2002; Stankiewicz et al., 1998). Whether the observed priming is
positive or negative depends on whether the probe task requires the
observer to actively ignore an irrelevant image. Second, both
behavioral evidence (e.g., Intraub, 1981) and evidence from
single-unit recording (e.g., Oram & Perrett, 1992) indicate that
object recognition is too fast to depend on analytic representations
alone. Together, the speed and automaticity of object recognition
suggest that structural descriptions cannot be the only basis for
entry-level common object recognition (for a review, see Hummel,
2001).
In order to account for the speed and automaticity of common
object recognition, while at the same time accounting for those
properties of object recognition that are consistent with the role of
structural descriptions, Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996a; Hum-
mel, 2001) proposed a hybrid model of object recognition. The key
idea behind the model is that holistic representations of shape can
be generated rapidly and automatically because they do not rep-
resent object features or parts independently of their relations and,
as a result, they do not require dynamic binding of parts to their
relations. According to this model, attending to an object’s image
activates (and therefore visually primes) both a structural descrip-
tion of the object’s shape and a holistic (i.e., view-like) represen-
tation of its shape; ignoring an image activates the holistic repre-
sentation of its shape but not the structural description. The
resulting model accounts for a large number of phenomena in
human shape perception and object recognition (including all those
cited above) and also generates several novel predictions (see
Hummel, 2001).
One set of novel predictions concerns the relationship between
visual attention and patterns of visual priming across left–right
(i.e., mirror) reflections. The structural descriptions generated by
the Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996a; Hummel, 2001) model are
invariant with left–right reflection (i.e., the structural description
the model generates in response to one image is identical to the
structural description it generates in response to its left–right
reflection; the same is true of the models of Hummel & Bieder-
man, 1992, and Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1998). However, the
model’s holistic representations are sensitive to left–right reflec-
tion (i.e., an image and its reflection may generate nonoverlapping
holistic representations). As such, the model predicts that attending
to an object image will activate (and visually prime) both that
image and its left–right reflection, whereas ignoring the image will
activate and prime that image but not its reflection.
Stankiewicz et al. (1998) tested and confirmed the predictions of
the hybrid analytic/holistic model in an object naming task with
paired prime–probe trials. A prime trial consisted of a fixation
cross followed by a cuing box to the left or right of fixation,
followed by two line drawings of common objects, one appearing
inside the cuing box and the other appearing on the other side of
fixation. The participants’ task was to name the cued image (the
attended prime); they were not required to respond to the other
image (the ignored prime). Each prime display was followed by a
probe display containing a single image at fixation. The task was
to name the object. The probe image depicted either the same
object as the attended prime, the same object as the ignored prime,
or an object the participant had not previously seen in the exper-
iment (an unprimed probe, which served as a baseline). Probe
images (except for unprimed probes) were either identical to the
corresponding primes or were left–right reflections of them. At-
tended prime images reliably primed both themselves and their
left–right reflections. However, ignored prime images only primed
themselves. Moreover, the effects of attention (attended vs. ig-
nored) and reflection (identical images vs. left–right reflections)
were strictly additive: The priming advantage for same view
prime–probe trials was equivalent in both attended and unattended
conditions (about 50 ms). The fact that attention and reflection had
additive effects on priming provides strong support for the inde-
pendence of the holistic and structured representations of shape in
the hybrid model.
A second prediction of the Hummel and Stankiewicz (1996a;
Hummel, 2001) hybrid model derives from the fact that the holistic
representation, although sensitive to left–right reflection, is invari-
ant with translation and scale. That is, even the representation
generated on the holistic representation is independent of the
object’s location or size. The hybrid model predicts that priming
for both attended and ignored images should be invariant with
translation and scale. Stankiewicz and Hummel (2002) tested and
confirmed this prediction. Although priming for attended images is
globally greater than priming for ignored images, priming for both
attended and ignored images is invariant with both translation and
scale.
Although the findings of Stankiewicz and colleagues (Stank-
iewicz & Hummel, 2002; Stankiewicz, Hummel, & Cooper, 1998)
are clearly consistent with the hybrid model, they do not provide
direct support for the model’s primary theoretical assertion, which
is that object shape is represented in a hybrid analytic/holistic
fashion. It is possible, for example, that both attended and ignored
images are represented in a strictly holistic fashion but that atten-
tion permits the visual system to “flip” the representation of an
image, permitting recognition (and priming) that is invariant over
mirror reflections. Therefore, in the present experiments, we ex-
ploited the fact that analytic representations of shape are neces-
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sarily more robust to configural distortions (such as splitting an
image down the middle and moving the left half of the image to the
right-hand side; see Figure 1) than are holistic representations; this
point bears elaboration.
Holistic representations are matched “all of a piece.” For exam-
ple, a holistic representation of the intact horse in Figure 1 (e.g., a
view of the horse in a typical view-based model; e.g., Edelman,
1998; Poggio & Edelman, 1990; Ullman & Basri, 1991) would be
matched, in its entirety, against an object’s image to determine the
degree of fit between the image and the holistic representation (i.e.,
view) in memory: The coordinates of the features in the viewed
image would be matched to the coordinates of the features in the
stored view, and the degree of fit would be computed as a function
of the vector similarity of the coordinates of corresponding fea-
tures. The process is directly analogous to laying a template for the
intact horse over the image of the split horse and counting the
points of overlap. By this holistic measure of similarity, the intact
and split horse images are utterly different because no correspond-
ing (and few, if any, similar) features reside in equivalent locations
in the two images.
By contrast, to an analytic representation of shape, the intact and
split images of the horse, although by no means identical, are
nonetheless highly similar because they depict many of the same
parts in many of the same spatial relations: Both depict a torso-like
shape connected in various relations to leg- and head-like shapes.
It is unimportant that the image-splitting procedure does not result
in a “natural” parsing of the object into its parts. Splitting an image
down the middle is very unlikely to parse it into pieces that
correspond to part boundaries, but this is unproblematic for struc-
tural description theories as long as the shapes of the object’s parts
(such as the halves of the horse’s torso in Figure 1) are recoverable
from the information presented in each half of the image (Bieder-
man, 1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992). And most if not all of
the time, the parts’ shapes will be recoverable (e.g., note that the
horse is recognizable from either the front half or the left half
alone). Recovery is easy because the relations between connected
parts are much more important to shape perception than are rela-
tions between separated parts (Saiki & Hummel, 1996, 1998a,
1998b). In the split image, the front of the horse is not connected
to the back of the horse, so the resulting incorrect spatial relations
between, say, the horse’s head and its hind legs have little percep-
tual effect. Indeed, Cave and Kosslyn (1993) showed that split
stimuli are substantially easier to recognize after short presentation
times than are scrambled objects that disturb the spatial relation-
ships between parts.
Some recent view-based models (notably Edelman & Intrator,
2000, 2003) are based not on templates for whole objects but,
rather, templates for object fragments—subsets of complete ob-
jects (e.g., the upper half of an object; see Edelman & Intrator,
2003). Such models appear, at first blush, to be able to appreciate
the similarity between a split image and its intact counterpart: A
split image would seem to activate the same fragments as an intact
version of the same image, thereby permitting visual priming from
one to the other. However, even this fragment-based version of
view-based theory predicts that a split image will not prime its
intact counterpart. The reason is that the fragments these models
use to represent object shape are tied to specific locations in the
visual field (a representational scheme dubbed what  where
coding; see Edelman & Intrator, 2000, 2003). As a result, an intact
object image will activate one set of fragments (e.g., a fragment for
the front of a left-facing horse in the left part of the visual field and
a fragment for the back half of the same horse in the right half of
the visual field), and a split version of the same image will activate
a completely separate set of fragments (e.g., a fragment for the
front half of a left-facing horse in the right half of the visual field
and a fragment for the back half of that horse in the left half of the
visual field). Because the two sets of fragments are nonoverlap-
ping, the model predicts no priming from one to the other (see
Hummel, 2003b).
At the other extreme, Mel and colleagues (e.g., Mel, 1997; Mel
& Fiser, 2000) have proposed that the visual system recognizes
objects simply by matching lists of location-invariant features to
object memory. Such models are sensitive to which features are
present in an object’s image, but they are completely indifferent to
the locations of those features (either relative to one another or in
the image as a whole). These models predict that a split image will
prime its intact counterpart (because the two depict many of the
same features) but that this effect will obtain whether the split
image is attended or not.
The general point is that without the ability to represent an
object’s parts independently of their locations, a model cannot
predict priming from a split image to its intact counterpart. And
without the ability to represent spatial relations explicitly (e.g., to
represent which part is connected to which, located where relative
to which, etc.), a model cannot separate an object’s parts from their
locations without losing the ability to represent how the parts are
arranged. In other words, models based exclusively on holistic
representations of shape—that is, conjunctions of shapes in par-
Figure 1. Examples of intact and split images used in Experiments 1–3.
From “A Standardized Set of 260 Pictures: Norms for Name Agreement,
Image Agreement, Familiarity, and Visual Complexity,” by J. G.
Snodgrass and M. Vanderwart, 1980, Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Learning and Memory, 6, p. 200. Copyright 1980 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission of the author.
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ticular locations—cannot, in principle, predict that a split image
could visually prime its intact counterpart. Only an analytic rep-
resentation, such as a structural description—in which an object’s
parts are represented independently of their locations (and rela-
tions)—or a feature list (e.g., Mel, 1997), can predict that a split
image will visually prime its intact counterpart. And of these
models, only the hybrid model of Hummel and Stankiewicz
(1996a; Hummel, 2001) predicts that the priming from a split
image to its intact counterpart will be moderated by visual
attention.
The present article reports three experiments designed to di-
rectly test the central theoretical assertion of the hybrid model,
investigating whether the representation of an attended image is
analytic and whether the representation of an ignored image is
holistic. Experiment 1 investigated the role of attention in priming
for split and intact object images. Participants named objects in
pairs of prime–probe trials (as in Stankiewicz & Hummel, 2002;
Stankiewicz, et al., 1998). The first trial in a pair served as the
prime and presented two object images, one of which (the attended
image) was spatially precued. The participants’ task was to name
the precued object, ignoring the other (the ignored image). Half of
the prime images were presented intact, and half were split either
horizontally or vertically, as illustrated in Figure 1. The variables
of attention (attended vs. ignored image) and image type (intact vs.
split) were crossed orthogonally. The probe image was always
intact and corresponded either to the attended prime, the ignored
prime, or an image that the participant had not previously seen in
the experiment (which served as a baseline). The hybrid analytic/
holistic model predicts that intact images will prime themselves
whether they are attended or not (although priming should be
greater for attended than for ignored images); split images should
prime their intact counterparts when they are attended but not
when they are ignored.
Experiment 2 served to estimate what fraction of the priming
observed in Experiment 1 was specifically visual (as opposed to
name or concept priming). Experiment 3 tested whether the prim-
ing for ignored images in Experiment 1 could be attributed to
low-level visual representations (e.g., of the local features in an
object’s image) rather than holistic representations in long-term
memory (LTM). On the former (low-level priming) account, ig-
nored split images should prime themselves as much as ignored
intact images prime themselves. On the latter (hybrid model)
account, only ignored intact images should prime themselves.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Forty-two native English speakers with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision participated for credit in introductory psychol-
ogy courses at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Materials. Black-and-white line drawings of 84 asymmetrical objects
from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set were displayed on a PC
monitor. Response times (RTs) were collected using E-Prime (Version 1.0)
with a dynamic trigger microphone attached to an interface box. Partici-
pants sat approximately 90 cm from the display. The images were stan-
dardized in size to subtend 4.0° of visual angle. For each object, a split
version was created by using a 50% offset filter in Adobe Photoshop
(Version 5.5), resulting in images that appeared to be cut into two halves
that were relocated to the opposite side of the canvas (vertically or
horizontally). The manipulation did not alter the total number of pixels in
an image or the number or local configuration of any image features,
except in that some lines were necessarily broken at the location of the cut
(see Figure 1).
Procedure. The experimental conditions in which objects appeared
were counterbalanced across participants by placing each image into one of
14 clusters, each containing six images, for the seven different prime–
probe conditions. These conditions were attended–intact, attended–split,
attended–not probed, ignored–intact, ignored–split, ignored–not probed,
and unprimed. All primes preceded an intact probe image, and all images
appeared in all seven conditions equally often across participants.
An image appeared in only 1 trial pair for any given participant. The
ordering of the 36 trials and the pairing of attended and ignored objects on
prime trials were randomized for each participant. The participants read
instructions, which they then paraphrased back to the experimenter. The
experimental session began with 18 practice trials using a set of images
different from the experimental set. After the practice trials, the partici-
pants were asked whether they had any questions.
The sequence of events in a trial is depicted in Figure 2. An unfilled
circle in the center of the screen remained until the participant started the
trial by pressing the space bar. The circle was then replaced with a fixation
cross, which remained on the screen for 495 ms, followed by a blank white
screen for 30 ms. An attentional cuing square 4.5° of visual angle on a side
was then presented either to the left or to the right of the fixation cross,
centered 4.0° from fixation. After 75 ms, two object images were displayed
simultaneously for 120 ms, with the attended image inside the square and
the unattended image centered 4.0° from fixation on the other side of the
screen. The prime images could be both intact, both split or one of each.
After the images disappeared, a blank screen was shown for 30 ms,
Figure 2. Sequence of displays in Experiment 1. Images are from “A
Standardized Set of 260 Pictures: Norms for Name Agreement, Image
Agreement, Familiarity, and Visual Complexity,” by J. G. Snodgrass and
M. Vanderwart, 1980, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learn-
ing and Memory, 6, p. 200. Copyright 1980 by the American Psychological
Association. Adapted with permission of the author.
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followed by a random-line pattern mask that covered the entire screen
(15.6° of visual angle) for 495 ms. The entire prime display lasted less than
200 ms, a duration too short to permit a saccade to the cuing square or
either object. The participant’s task at prime was to say the name of the
cued (attended) object as quickly and as accurately as possible.
After the prime display, a blank screen was displayed for 1,995 ms,
followed by a fixation cross (495 ms). Following a 30-ms blank screen, the
probe image was displayed in the center of the screen for 150 ms. The
probe depicted either the attended object (attended conditions), the ignored
object (ignored conditions), or an object the participant had not seen
previously in the experiment (unprimed baseline condition). The probe
image was always intact. In total, 3,015 ms elapsed between the end of the
prime display and the beginning of the probe display. The probe display
was followed by a single pattern mask (4.6° of visual angle) shown for 495
ms. The participant’s task was to name the probe object as quickly and as
accurately as possible. RTs at probe were recorded by the computer
through a voice key attached to a microphone on the table.
The computer displayed the names of the attended prime and the probe
object, as well as the probe RT. At the end of each trial pair, the experi-
menter used the keyboard to record the participant’s accuracy as well as
voice-key errors (i.e., when the voice key triggered erroneously). The
participant could then initiate the next trial with a keypress.
Results and Discussion
In all conditions, priming was calculated as the participant’s
mean RT at probe in the unprimed (baseline) condition minus their
mean RT in the corresponding experimental condition. Trials on
which either the prime or probe responses were incorrect (12.3%)
were excluded from the statistical analysis, as were voice key
errors (3.9%). To verify that attention was deployed according to
the instructions of each condition, the configuration (intact vs.
split) of the unprobed prime was included as a variable in the
analysis.
A 2 (attention: attended vs. ignored)  2 (prime configuration:
intact vs. split)  2 (unprobed prime: intact vs. split) within-
subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed reliable main
effects of attention, F(1, 41)  138.77, p  .001, and prime
configuration, F(1, 41)  11.35, p  .002, but the Attention 
Prime Configuration interaction did not approach reliability, F(1,
41)  1 (see Figure 3 and Table 1). There was no main effect of
unprobed prime or any interaction involving that factor (all Fs 
1). Thus, there was no indication of attention being deployed
differently if both prime images were intact, split, or one of each.
There were no indications of a speed–accuracy trade-off in any
condition.
Analysis of each priming condition was carried out to determine
which type of prime display caused savings in RT for the probe
display (i.e., faster naming responses relative to unprimed probes).
Priming was reliably greater than zero (Bonferroni corrected) in
the attended–intact, t(41)  13.85, p  .001, attended–split,
t(41)  9.44, p  .001, and ignored–intact conditions, t(41) 
3.36, p  .01, but not in the ignored–split condition, t(41)  1.
In general, the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with
previous research, for both positive and negative priming, demon-
strating that object recognition can take place in the absence of
visual attention (e.g., Stankiewicz et al., 1998; Tipper & Driver,
1988; Treisman & DeSchepper, 1996). As predicted by the hybrid
model, split images primed their intact counterparts only when
they (the split images) were attended, but both attended and
ignored intact images primed their intact counterparts. There was
a reliable priming advantage for intact primes over split primes
which was almost identical in both attended and ignored condi-
tions (50 ms, replicating Stankiewicz et al., 1998). Thus, the
effects of attention (attended vs. ignored) and configuration (intact
vs. split) were strictly additive. These results strongly support the
hypothesis that two qualitatively different representations of shape
mediate priming in object recognition: an analytic representation
that is relatively robust to configural distortions but requires at-
tention and a holistic representation that is sensitive to configural
distortion but does not require attention.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 necessarily confounded attention with naming: If
and only if the participants attended an image did they name it.
Therefore, it is at least logically possible that all the priming in the
attended conditions derived from concept or name priming. Pre-
Figure 3. Priming means (baseline RT  RT in each experimental condition) for Experiment 1 as a function
of whether the prime image was (a) attended or ignored and (b) intact or split (N  42). Error bars represent
standard errors. RT  response time.
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vious research (Biederman & Cooper, 1991a, 1991b, 1992; Bied-
erman & Gerhardstein, 1993; Stankiewicz et al., 1998) has shown
that priming from attended images is largely (although not com-
pletely) visual. However, this fact does not imply that the priming
observed in the current paradigm is necessarily visual. As such, it
is necessary to tease apart what fraction of the priming observed in
the current paradigm is visual and what fraction nonvisual (e.g.,
concept or name priming).
Experiment 2 was designed to estimate what fraction of the
priming observed in Experiment 1 was due to visual (as opposed
to concept and/or name) priming. To this end, images in the
identical-image conditions of Experiment 1 (attended–intact,
ignored–intact) were replaced with images of objects having the
same basic-level name as the corresponding probe object but a
different shape (same-name-different-exemplar [SNDE], follow-
ing Biederman & Cooper, 1991a, 1991b, 1992; Biederman &
Gerhardstein, 1993; Stankiewicz et al., 1998). For example, if a
grand piano (basic-level name piano) served as a probe object,
then Experiment 2 presented an intact image of an upright piano
(“piano”) in the SNDE prime condition (instead of an identical
grand piano) and a split version of the image of the grand piano in
the split conditions. The conditions with split images (attended–
split, ignored–split) were identical to those in Experiment 1 in that
the split object of the prime display was followed by an intact
probe object of the same exemplar. If any of the priming observed
for attended objects in the split condition in Experiment 2 is
specifically visual, then we expect more priming with split image
(grand piano) primes than with SNDE (upright piano) primes. By
contrast, if all the priming observed with split images in Experi-
ment 1 was simply name or concept priming, then the SNDE
images should prime as much as (or more than) the split images
(see Biederman & Cooper, 1991a; Stankiewicz et al., 1998).
Method
Participants. Forty-two native English speakers with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision participated for credit in introductory psychol-
ogy courses at the University of California, Los Angeles, and at Gold-
smiths College, University of London, London, United Kingdom.
Materials. The experiment used a set of 84 objects in 42 SNDE pairs.
Half were taken from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set used in
Experiment 1, and the corresponding SNDE exemplars were line drawings
of similar style.
Procedure. The conditions in Experiment 2 were identical to those of
Experiment 1 except that the intact primes were replaced by SNDE primes.
Thus, each probe image in the intact conditions was paired with an intact
probe image of a different object with the same name (rather than being
paired with itself, as in Experiment 1). As in Experiment 1, all objects
appeared equally often in each of the seven prime–probe conditions.
Results and Discussion
Trials in which either the prime or probe were named incorrectly
were excluded (20.1%), as were voice-key errors (3.7%). Figure 4
and Table 2 show the priming results in each condition. A 2
(attention: attended vs. ignored)  2 (prime type: SNDE vs. split
image)  2 (unprobed prime: intact vs. split) within-subject
ANOVA revealed reliable main effects of attention, F(1, 41) 
34.53, p  .001, and prime type, F(1, 41)  6.10, p  .02. The
Attention  Prime Type interaction was also reliable, F(1, 41) 
10.86, p  .002. A Newman–Keuls post hoc analysis on the
interaction revealed that the difference between the attended–
SNDE and attended–split conditions was statistically reliable ( p 
.008), but the difference between the ignored–SNDE and ignored–
split conditions was not ( p  .60). There was no main effect of
Table 1
Mean Response Times (RTs; in Milliseconds), Standard Errors,
and Percentages of Error for Conditions in Experiment 1
Variable
Attended Ignored
UnprimedIntact Split Intact Split
RT 595 649 762 816 813
SE 19 15 15 19 17
% error 7 15 11 13 14
Figure 4. Priming means (baseline RT  RT in each experimental condition) for Experiment 2 as a function
of whether the prime object was (a) attended or ignored and (b) a same-name-different-exemplar (SNDE) or a
split image (N  42). Error bars represent standard errors. RT  response time.
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unprobed prime, and there were no interactions involving that
factor ( ps  .14 for all comparisons). There were no indications of
a speed–accuracy trade-off.
Analysis of each priming condition was carried out to determine
which type of prime display caused savings in RT for the probe
display (i.e., faster naming responses relative to unprimed probes).
Priming was reliably greater (Bonferroni corrected) than zero in
the attended–split condition, t(41)  5.89, p  .001, was almost so
in the attended–SNDE condition, t(41)  2.27, p  .03 (critical
value: p  .0125), but was not in either the ignored–SNDE,
t(41)  1, or the ignored–split condition, t(41)  1. Thus, SNDE
and split images primed the corresponding probe image when
attended but not when ignored.
Experiment 2 showed that an intact probe was primed more by
an attended split image than by an intact different exemplar of the
same basic-level category. The priming advantage for attended
split objects over attended intact SNDEs was about 80 ms. Because
in both cases participants responded with the same name in prime
and probe trials, this difference indicates a strong visual compo-
nent to the priming in the attended and ignored conditions. Indeed,
the lack of any priming for unattended SNDE primes suggests that
all the priming observed in the unattended condition of Experiment
1 was specifically visual.
Experiment 2 found no priming in either of the ignored condi-
tions. It therefore not only replicated the lack of priming for
ignored split images in Experiment 1 but also produced no priming
that was reliably greater than zero for SNDE prime images (rep-
licating Stankiewicz et al., 1998). These last results contrast with
the findings of Tipper (1985), who showed evidence of negative
semantic priming for ignored stimuli (see Stankiewicz et al., 1998,
for a discussion).
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 together demonstrated visual priming for
intact and split images in the attended conditions, but only intact
images were primed in the ignored conditions. This pattern of
priming is expected on the account that the visual system generates
holistic representations of ignored images and analytic represen-
tations of attended images (Hummel, 2001; Hummel & Stank-
iewicz, 1996a). However, an alternative interpretation of the re-
sults of Experiments 1 and 2 is that all the observed priming
resides in early visual representations (i.e., rather than in the
representations responsible for object recognition, as assumed by
the hybrid model) and that identical images simply prime one
another more than nonidentical images, and attended images prime
one another more than unattended images. If this “early-priming”
account is correct, then the advantage for identical images over
nonidentical images and the advantage for attended images over
unattended images could combine to yield the effects observed in
Experiment 1. Although this interpretation is challenged by the
results of Stankiewicz and Hummel (2002), which showed that
priming for ignored images is invariant with translation and
scale—and by the fact that intact and split versions of the same
image present corresponding features to very different retinal
locations and, therefore, probably activate few of the same neurons
in early visual processing at areas V1 and V2—it cannot be ruled
out completely only on the basis of the results of Experiments 1
and 2.
Experiment 3 was designed to establish whether the results of
Experiments 1 and 2 reflect simply priming in early visual repre-
sentations or a reliance on holistic processing for ignored images,
as predicted by the hybrid model. The logic of Experiment 3 is
based on an assumption about the locus of the visual priming
observed in these and other experiments. Priming is a form of
learning, leading Cooper, Biederman, and Hummel (1992) to spec-
ulate that one likely locus of visual priming is the point at which
visual representations of object shape make contact with represen-
tations stored in LTM (see Biederman & Cooper, 1991a, for
evidence supporting this conjecture). Thus, visual priming—in-
cluding priming of ignored images—must reflect the activation of
preexisting representations in LTM. Indeed, Potter (1976) has
shown that failing to attend to a stimulus results in a failure to
encode it into LTM. If an image does not have an existing
representation in LTM, then ignoring that image on one occasion
should not prime recognition of the very same image on a subse-
quent occasion. Consistent with this reasoning, Stankiewicz (1997)
showed that ignoring an upside-down image on one trial does not
prime recognition of the very same (i.e., upside-down) image on
the next trial.
Applied to our current paradigm, the logic is as follows: If the
results of Experiments 1 and 2 reflect the role of holistic repre-
sentations in the recognition of ignored images, and if these
holistic representations are encoded in LTM in an intact (rather
than a split) format, then ignoring a split image on one occasion
should not prime recognition of the very same image on a subse-
quent occasion. However, if the results of Experiments 1 and 2
reflect priming of early visual features (in both the attended and
ignored cases), then ignoring a split image on one trial should
prime recognition of that image on the subsequent trial. By con-
trast, both accounts would predict that attending to a split image on
one trial should permit the encoding and, therefore, priming of that
image.
Method
Participants. Thirty-six English speakers with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision participated for money or for credit in introductory psychol-
ogy courses at Goldsmiths College, University of London.
Materials. The experiment used a set of 84 objects; 36 were used in
prime–probe target pairs, and the rest were fillers for attended and ignored
primes. The items were taken from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980)
set and were similar to those used in Experiment 1.
Procedure. Experiment 3 used the same procedure as Experiment 1,
except that (a) half of the time, the probe was a split image (recall that in
Experiment 1, all probe images were intact), and (b) the configuration of
Table 2
Mean Response Times (RTs; in Milliseconds), Standard Errors,
and Percentages of Error for Conditions in Experiment 2
Variable
Attended Ignored
UnprimedSNDE Split SNDE Split
RT 689 615 735 748 749
SE 22 19 24 25 16
% error 18 24 22 14 22
Note. SNDE  same-name-different-exemplar.
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the probe image (split or intact) was always the same as the configuration
(intact or split) of the corresponding prime. Naturally, this constraint does
not apply to unprimed baseline images, which have no corresponding
prime. Unprobed items for prime trials were always intact images, except
for the unprimed–split (baseline) condition.
Results and Discussion
Trials in which either the prime or probe were named incorrectly
were excluded (15.7%), together with voice-key errors (4.9%).
Priming was calculated in the same way as in Experiment 1, except
that two different baseline conditions (unprimed–split and
unprimed–intact) were used to calculate the corresponding priming
for split and for intact conditions. Figure 5 and Table 3 depict the
amount of priming observed in each condition. A 2 (attention:
attended vs. ignored)  2 (configuration: intact vs. split) within-
subject ANOVA revealed a reliable main effect of attention, F(1,
35)  119.42, p  .001, but not configuration, F(1, 35)  1.
However, the Attention  Configuration interaction was reliable,
F(1, 35)  12.54, p  .01. A Newman–Keuls post hoc analysis of
the interaction revealed a reliable difference between the ignored–
intact and ignored–split conditions ( p  .002) but not between the
attended–intact and attended–split conditions ( p  .17).
Analysis of each priming condition was carried out to determine
which type of prime display caused savings in RT for the probe
display (i.e., faster naming responses relative to unprimed probes).
Priming was reliably greater than zero (Bonferroni corrected) in
the attended–intact, t(35)  7.67, p  .001, attended–split, t(35) 
11.93, p  .001, and ignored–intact conditions, t(35)  2.81, p 
.01, but it was not reliably greater than zero in the ignored–split
condition, t(35)  1.1
Figure 5 shows that the pattern of priming for attended condi-
tions differs somewhat from those of Experiments 1 and 2. When
attended, a split image primed itself just as much as an intact image
primed itself. At first blush, this result seems surprising, especially
given the failure of ignored split images to prime themselves at all.
However, there were both more errors and longer latencies for split
images, suggesting that split images are simply harder to recognize
(see Table 3), making it likely that they profit more from priming
than do intact images (see, e.g., Potter, 1976; Rensink, 2000).
Because Experiment 3 differed from Experiments 1 and 2 in the
use of different baselines, we also carried out analyses of the raw
probe latencies. A 3 (prime type: attended, ignored, unprimed) 
2 (configuration: intact vs. split) ANOVA on probe latencies
revealed main effects of prime type, F(2, 70)  94.71, p  .001,
and configuration, F(1, 35)  29.83, p  .001, and a significant
Prime Type  Configuration interaction, F(2, 70)  5.54, p  .01.
A Newman–Keuls post hoc analysis of the interaction revealed no
difference between latencies for split images compared with those
for intact images in the attended conditions ( p  .11) but reliable
differences in the ignored conditions ( p  .001) and unprimed
conditions ( p  .01). Thus, the pattern of results shown in Figure 5
is not simply the result of baseline differences in the recognition of
split images.
A 3 (prime type: attended, ignored, unprimed)  2 (configura-
tion: intact vs. split) ANOVA on error rates (excluding voice-key
errors) revealed only a main effect of configuration, F(1, 35) 
12.87, p  .01, with error rates for split images higher than for
1 The size difference between the cuing square and the object was 0.5°
of visual angle. A reviewer suggested that this may be a small enough
separation to allow completion of the split images. Thus, the difference
between attended and ignored split-image conditions could have arisen
from there being completion only in the former case. Although there are
several reasons for discounting completion as an explanation of the pattern
of results in Experiments 1–3, the most straightforward way was to assess
the effect of a larger separation between the cuing square and image. In a
replication, 36 participants took part in an identical experiment to Exper-
iment 3, except that the size difference between cuing square and image
was now 1° of visual angle. The statistical pattern of results was very
similar; the only two reliable effects were for attention, F(1, 35)  84.44,
p  .001, and for the Attention  Configuration interaction, F(1, 35) 
10.47, p  .01. Thus, there was reliable priming in all conditions (at-
tended–intact: 160.6 ms; attended–ignored: 204.3 ms; ignored–intact: 49.9
ms), except for the ignored–split condition (16.8 ms).
Figure 5. Priming means (baseline RT  RT in each experimental condition) for Experiment 3 as a function
of whether (a) the prime object was attended or ignored and (b) both prime and probe were split or intact (N 
36). Error bars represent standard errors. RT  response time.
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intact images. Thus, there is no evidence of a speed–accuracy
trade-off in any condition.
As predicted by the hybrid model—but not by the early visual
priming hypothesis—Experiment 3 showed that split images
primed themselves when they were attended but not when they
were ignored, whereas intact images primed themselves whether
they were attended or not. In addition, in the attended conditions,
split images primed themselves just as much as intact images.
Experiment 3 thus demonstrated that the lack of priming for
ignored split images in Experiment 1 cannot be attributed to a
general decrease of priming in response to split images and, more
generally, that the priming pattern observed in Experiment 1
cannot be explained by a simple “more priming for identical
images” (low-level visual) account.
General Discussion
The results of these three experiments strongly support the
central theoretical tenet of the hybrid model of object recognition
(Hummel, 2001; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996a), that object
recognition is based on a hybrid analytic/holistic representation of
object shape. In Experiment 1, attended intact, attended split, and
ignored intact images primed subsequent recognition of corre-
sponding intact images, whereas ignored split images did not
prime their intact counterparts. This pattern of effects is predicted
by the hybrid account because attended images are represented
both analytically and holistically, whereas ignored images are
represented only holistically. Since a holistic representation of a
split image has little or nothing in common with a holistic repre-
sentation of its intact counterpart, ignoring a split image (and
thereby representing it only holistically) is not expected to prime
its intact counterpart. Ignoring an intact image, by contrast, is
expected to prime its intact counterpart. Priming is expected for an
analytic representation of a split image because it has a great deal
in common with an analytic representation of its intact counterpart;
thus, attending to a split image is expected to prime its intact
counterpart.
Experiment 1 also revealed another important aspect of the
hybrid account. Because an attended image is expected to be
represented both analytically and holistically, attending to an intact
image (thereby priming both the analytic and holistic representa-
tions) is expected to prime that image more than attending to its
split counterpart (which is expected to prime the analytic repre-
sentation only). The advantage for an intact prime (relative to a
split prime) was exactly the same (50 ms) in both the attended
and the ignored conditions. This additive effect of configuration
with attention (like the additive effects of view [identical vs.
reflected] and attention observed by Stankiewicz et al., 1998)
suggests that the analytic and holistic representations are processed
in parallel and make independent contact with object memory (see
also Stankiewicz et al., 1998).
Experiment 2 demonstrated that a substantial fraction (at least
80 ms) of the observed priming for attended objects was specifi-
cally visual (rather than simply name or concept priming). Exper-
iment 3 showed that ignored split images did not prime even
themselves; but, when attended, split images primed themselves at
least as much as intact images primed themselves. These results
indicate that the results of Experiments 1 and 2 reflect visual
priming at the interface of shape perception and object memory
and cannot be accounted for by simply assuming that identical
images always prime themselves more than nonidentical images
and that attended images always prime themselves more than
unattended images. Together, the results of Experiments 1–3
strongly suggest that, as predicted by the hybrid model, the visual
system represents attended images both analytically and holisti-
cally and represents ignored images only holistically.
One of the most striking aspects of the findings presented here
is that the results of Experiment 1 (Figure 3) are nearly an exact
numerical replication of the findings of Stankiewicz et al. (1998,
Experiment 1) who used left–right reflections rather than split
images. In both studies, identical images enjoyed a priming ad-
vantage of approximately 50 ms over nonidentical (i.e., split or
reflected) images in both attended and ignored conditions. The fact
that configural distortions (splitting an image) and left–right re-
flection have such similar effects on attended and unattended
images suggests that similar mechanisms are at work in both cases
(as predicted by the hybrid model). Namely, attention permits the
visual system to generate an analytic representation robust to both
configural distortions and left–right reflection, whereas in the
absence of attention, the visual system must rely on holistic rep-
resentations that are robust to neither of these manipulations.
The findings reported here are inconsistent with the majority of
models of object recognition currently in the literature. View-
based models (e.g., Poggio & Edelman, 1990; Tarr & Bu¨lthoff,
1995; Ullman & Basri, 1991) and their relatives (e.g., Edelman &
Intrator, 2000, 2003; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999) are based
strictly on varieties of holistic coding and cannot account for the
fact that a split image can visually prime its intact counterpart.
More generally, these models are inconsistent with the role of
relations in shape perception (Hummel, 2000; Hummel & Bieder-
man, 1992) and with the capacity of the human visual system to
represent aspects of object shape independently of one another
(i.e., nonholistically; Stankiewicz, 2002). Pure structural descrip-
tion theories (e.g., Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Biederman, 1992;
Marr & Nishihara, 1978), as well as feature-listing theories (Mel,
1997; Mel & Fiser, 2000), provide a natural account of the fact that
split images can visually prime their intact counterparts, but these
models fail to account for the role of visual attention in this
capacity. Feature-based models, in particular, predict that visual
priming should persist over many kinds of configural distortions
(including random scrambling of an object’s features about the
image; Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Mel, 1997), regardless of
whether the distorted image is attended or ignored. Accounting
both for the fact that split images can prime their intact counter-
parts and for the fact that this priming depends on visual attention
requires a hybrid account in which attention is required to generate
Table 3
Mean Response Times (RTs; in Milliseconds), Standard Errors,
and Percentages of Error for Conditions in Experiment 3
Variable
Attended Ignored Unprimed
Intact Split Intact Split Intact Split
RT 630 662 768 890 830 887
SE 16 18 19 27 25 24
% error 8 20 17 17 12 20
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a splitting–robust representation of shape. Hybrid accounts based
on fragments derived from learned views (e.g., Edelman & Intra-
tor, 2000, 2003) do not predict visual priming from split images to
their intact counterparts because the proposed fragments are tied to
specific locations in the image. Moreover, fragment theory pre-
dicts that multiple fixations are needed during initial encoding in
order to establish the various location-dependent object fragments
(Edelman & Intrator, 2003). In our experiments split images
primed subsequent intact probe images even though their presen-
tation duration was too short to permit saccades.
The findings presented here have additional important implica-
tions for theories of object recognition in general and for the
hybrid model in particular. The findings strongly suggest that the
analytic and holistic representations work in parallel rather than in
a serial manner (as predicted by the hybrid model). It is not simply
a matter of “early” priming for ignored images and “early and late”
priming for attended images. A serial model of this kind could, in
principle, account for the results of our Experiments 1 and 2 and
for the effects reported by Stankiewicz et al. (1998), who showed
that a change in viewpoint (left–right reflection) was associated
with a reduction in priming for both attended and ignored objects.
However, such an account cannot explain the priming effects
observed in Experiment 3, in which split images did not even
prime themselves when ignored.
Our findings also have implications for the breakdown of object
recognition with brain damage. Davidoff and Warrington (1999,
2001) reported case studies of patients who were extremely poor at
recognizing object parts or “exploded” objects, even though they
could name intact objects (in familiar views). In terms of the
hybrid model, it would seem that these patients’ holistic route was
unimpaired, allowing them to recognize objects presented in intact
familiar views, whereas their analytic route seemed to be impaired,
because recognition of parts was poor.
In conclusion, the experiments reported here demonstrated that
the visual representation generated in response to an attended
image is qualitatively different from that generated in response to
an ignored image. Although recognition takes place in both cases,
it is mediated by an analytic representation when the image is
attended and by a holistic representation when the image is ig-
nored. These findings suggest a very specific answer to the ques-
tion raised at the beginning of this article: How can the visual
representation of shape have some properties that demand expla-
nation in terms of analytic representations and simultaneously
have other properties that are strictly inconsistent with analytic
representations? It appears that the visual system represents shape
analytically when it can but represents it holistically when it must.
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